紅塵白塵

 A Critical Analysis of the Interpretation of the Relation between Hetu and Dharma in Buddhist Logic

(Proposal)

Lo King Chung

       Prerequisite is a major premise or a pervasion proposition of any deductive illation or even analogism.  In the west, the major premise in classical logic, which is represented typically by Aristotle’s syllogism, was accused of its invalidity by such skeptics as Pyrrho (BC 365-275) and David Hume (17171-1776).  In Buddhist logic, the interpretation and realization of the relation (Sk. Sāmbandha) between the inferring property (Sk. Hetu) and the inferred property (Sk. sādhyadharma) has become one of the keys to confirm the validity of a deductive structure, or more strictly speaking, the validity of Buddhist logic.

In the 5th-6th centuries, the advent of two Buddhist luminaries, Dignāga (480-540) and Dharmakīrti (600-660), yielded a glorious improvement of Buddhist logic theories.  As the principal inheritors, most Tibetan scholars declared that these two masters’ interpretations of Buddhist logic are theoretically identical.  But the various versions of the translation of Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti's works cannot but raise doubts about the aforementioned claim.  One considerable doubt is that there are obviously different interpretations of the relation between the inferring property and the inferred property in their works of Buddhist logic.  Therefore, this paper intends to have a comprehensive and comparative study of the evolution of the interpretations of the “relation” in Buddhist logic, and to find out what influence it has on the theory of Buddhist logic.  The main issues that this paper will discuss include:

1. A brief review of implicative agreement of the relation between the proving property and the proved property in the Buddhism works before Dignāga.  In this part, the works of three Buddhist scholars preceding Dignāga: Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, will be focused on as the basic study materials.  Although we can hardly work out a systematical explanation of the “relation” in their works, it is still possible for us to infer one from their implicative attitudes to this issue by analyzing the mass of their debating writings.

2. An analysis of Dignāga’s and his first disciples’ explanations of the relation.  As a founder of Buddhist logic theory, Dignāga left us with five works, four of which are perfectly preserved in Tibetan and one in Chinese.  Hereinto, his Pramānasamuccaya as well as its Vṛtti (in Tibetan translation) and Nyāyamukha (in Chinese translation) contain most discussions about the theories in Buddhist logic.  We will find that though Dignāga was the very first to take note of the necessity of ensuring a pervasion proposition as to be a prerequisite for a valid proof or reason, he didn’t explain how such a pervasion proposition validly comes to be our standard knowledge.  Furthermore, certain evidence from Nyāyamukha suggest that there remain some ambiguities in Dignāga’s logic theory concerning the interpretation of the “relation”.  These ambiguities are manifest in his first disciples’ understanding of the same issue.  Herein, two of his disciples are counted in: Iśvarasena and Xuan Zang (Chn:玄奘).  In fact, there are up till now not any Iśvarasena’s works on Buddhist logic that are available to us.  Only from Hetubindutīkā by Arcaṭa and Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā by Jñānaśrībhadra, have we found some accusations of the misunderstandings of Dignāga’s theory, pointing to Iśvarasena.  Thereafter, some Tibetan scholars linked Iśvarasena to one debating opponent, who was assumed to be a main disciple of Dignāga, in Dharmakīrti's works.  If this hypothesis is true, we can regain a rough picture of Iśvarasena’s description of the “relation” through the scattered debating in Dharmakīrti's works.  And from that we might have a view of Buddhist logic during the time when Dignāga had passed away and yet Dharmakīrti had not come in the spotlight.  Such proof doesn’t come singly but in pairs, because we have surprisingly found out the same so called “misinterpretation” of Dignāga both in Xuan Zang’s translation of Nyāyamukha and in his followers’ commentaries.  We are expecting that all of the aforementioned evidence will help us to reveal an immature theory about the “relation” right before Dharmakīrti.

3. A fine study on Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of the “relation”.  In order to defeat an academic retreat of Buddhist logic for over half a century after Dignāga, Dharmakīrti defended a pervasion proposition related to the inferring property and inferred property for the logical statement.  Furthermore, he brought forward his famous theory of the identity relation and causal relation between the inferring property and inferred property.  From the fifth to the fortieth verses in the first chapter of Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti explained extensively and deeply the definition of the “relation”, the two sub-branches of relation: the identity relation and the causal relation.  He also solemnly denied any exception to these two sections of “relations” and any exceptional valid proof or reasons supported by the “relation”.

4. A critical discussion of the Tibetan commentaries of the “relation”.  Buddhist logic took its original shape in India, and then achieved sophistication in Tibet.  Tibetan preserved the Indian logic not only by translating it into their own language but also by doing many more intensive researches and providing detailed commentaries on it.  Sa-sKya Paṇtiḍa Kun-dGa’ rGyal-mTshan and rGyal-Tshab Dar-Ma Rin-Chen are definitely outstanding from a long list of Tibetan logicians.  Sa-sKya Paṇtiḍa is considered as a reformer of Indian Buddhist logic.  He was a chief proofreader of the translation of Pramāṇavārttika.  What’s more, in his remarkable works, Tshad-Ma Rigs-Pa’i-gTer, Sa-sKya Paṇtiḍa adopted new approaches to the classification of the stages of perceptions, to determining the philosophical view associated with Buddhist logic and epistemology, and to decoding the profound meaning inside the Buddhist logic theory.  Especially, in Tshad-Ma Rigs-Pa’i-gTer there is a full chapter that particularly offers us Sa-sKya Paṇtiḍa’s unique understanding of the “relation”.  However, Dar-Ma Rin-Chen acted much conservatively in interpreting Dharmakīrti’s works.  He strictly followed the Indian tradition and meanwhile still kept his own opinion as to selecting a proper explanatory system amongst vast Indian commentaries of Buddhist logic.  Moreover, he made detailed commentaries of nearly every one of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s leading works and also of Sa-sKya Paṇtiḍa’s Tshad-Ma Rigs-Pa’i-gTer.

From Sa-sKya Paṇtiḍa and Dar-Ma Rin-Chen’s works, we will have a perfect view of the final achievement of Buddhist logic theory.  However, we are still far from claiming that we have had a perfect Buddhist logic theory.  As a matter of fact, most recent Tibetan logicians, who are supposedly living in the three Gelupa’s Buddhist monastic colleges -- Sera, Drepung and Ganden, admit that there are still many ambiguous issues requiring further deliberation in Buddhist logic.   They are mostly not in the texts but in colloquial debates, e.g. the validity of a causal relation applying to the causal (hetu), the necessity of a sample in realization of the “relation”, and the concealed meaning of the limitation of classification of relation, etc.

In conclusion, this paper will be based on vast original Tibetan and Chinese materials of Buddhist logic to illustrate the three stages of the explanations of “relation” in the history of Buddhist logic, thereby, outlining the progress of Buddhist logic theory.

Bibliography:

[1] Phyogs Kyi Glong Po (Dignāga). Tshad Ma bTus Pa’i ‘Grel Pa. (=Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti)

[2] Phyogs Kyi Glong Po (Dignāga). Tshad Ma’I bsTan bCos Rigs Pa La ‘Jug Pa Zhes Bya Ba. (The author of this book is now considered as Śaṃkarasvāmin by some academic members, even though he is made a record of Dignāga in the Tibetan scripture.)

[3] Phyogs Kyi Glong Po (Dignāga). gTan Tshigs Kyi ‘Khor Lo gTan La dBab Pa. (=Hetucakraḍamaru)

[4] Chos Kyi Grags Pa (Dharmakīrti). Tshad Ma rNam ‘Grel Gyi ‘Grel Pa. (=pramāṇavārttika-vṛtti)

[5] Chos Kyi Grags Pa (Dharmakīrti). Tshad Ma rNam Nges. (or: Tshad Ma rNam Par Nges Pa) (=pramāṇaviniścaya)

[6] Chos Kyi Grags Pa (Dharmakīrti). Rigs Pa’I Thigs Pa Zhes Bya Ba’I Rab Tu Byed Pa. (=nyāyabindu)

[7] Chos Kyi Grags Pa (Dharmakīrti). gTan Tshigs Kyi Thigs Pa Zhes Bya Pa’I Rab Tu Byed Pa. (=hetubindu)

[8] Chos Kyi Grags Pa (Dharmakīrti). ‘Brel Pa brTag Pa’I ‘Grel Pa. (=sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti)

[9] rGyal Ba’I dBang Po’I Blo Gros (Jinendrabudhi). Yang Ba Dang Dri Ma Me Pa Dang lDang Pa Zhes Bya Ba Tshad Ma Kun Las bTus Pa’I ‘Grel bShad. (=Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccaya-ṭīkā)

[10] Sh’aKya’I Blo (śākyabuddhi). Tshad Ma rNam ‘Grel Gyi bShad. (=pramāṇavārttika-tīkā)

[11] Ye Shes dPal bZang Po (Jñānaśrībhadra). Tshad Ma rNam Par Nges Pa’I ‘Grel bShad. (=Pramāṇavinścaya-ṭīkā)

[12] A Tsa Ta (Arcaṭa). gTan Tshigs Kyi Thigs Pa’I ‘Grel Pa. (=hetubinduvivaraṇa)

[12] Chos mChog (dharmottara). Rigs Pa'i Thigs Pa'i rGya Cher 'Grel Pa. (=nyāyabindu-tīkā)

[13] Dul Ba'i lHa (devendrabuddhi). Rigs Pa'i Thigs Pa'i rGya Cher 'Grel Pa. (=pramāṇavārttika-pañjikā)

[14] rGyal Tshab rJe. Tshad Ma rNam ‘Grel Gyi Tshig Le’ur Byas Pa’I rNam bShad Thar Lam Phyin Ci Ma Log Par gSal Bar Byed Pa.

[15] mGas Grub rJe. rGyal Pa’I bsTan bCos Tshad Ma rNam ‘Grel Gyi rGya Cher bShad Pa Rigs Pa’I rGya mTsho bZhugs So.

[16] dGe 'Dun Grub Pa. Tshad Ma'i bsTan bCos Rigs Pa'i rGyan Zhes Bya Ba bZhugs So.

[17] Nga dBang brTson 'Grus. Tshad Ma rNam 'Grel Gyi mTha' dPyod Thar Lam Rab gSal Tshad Ma'i 'od brGya 'Bar Ba Las Le'u Dang Po'i mTha' dPyod bLo gSal mGul rGan sKal bZang 'Jug Ngogs bZhugs So.

[18] Dignāga. Nyāyamukha. (Chn. 正理门论)

[19] Śaṃkarasvāmin. Nyāyapraveśa-śāstra. (Chn. 因明入正理论)

[20] Shen Tai (Chn. 神泰). A Commentary of Nyāyadvāraśāstr. (Chn. 正理门论述记)

[21] Kui Ji (窥基). A Commentary of Nyāyapraveśa-śāstra. (Chn. 因明入正理论疏)

[22] Wen Gui (文轨). A Commentary of Nyāyapraveśa-śāstra. (Chn. 因明入正理论疏)

[23] F. Th. Stcherbatsky. Buddhist Logic (Volume II) [M]. New York: Dover Publications Inc.

[24] John D. Dunne, Foundations of Dharmakiriti's Philosophy[M], Boston: Wisdom, 2004.

[25] Rajendra Prasad, Dharmakirti's Theory of Inference[M], New Delhi: Oxford, 2004.

[26] Lata S. Bapat, Buddhist Logic[M], New Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1989.

[27] Kalidas Bhattacharya, On the Concepts of Relation and Negation in Indian Philosophy[M], Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1977.

[28] Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, The Logic of Gotama[M], Hawaii: The University Press of Hawaii, 1978.